Calling upon the Name of God

[ymarkov]

From Golden Doves with Silver Dots by R' Jose Faur, p. 37 ff:

6. Calling upon the Name of God

Magic presupposes a metaphysical system through which physical and spiritual phenomena are manipulated. Without such a system magic is inoperative. The “name” is the linguistic nexus between a thing and its “essence” or metaphysical dimensions. More precisely, the name is identical to the essence.’ Knowledge of the name gives unlimited power over the thing bearing the name. Even the gods are powerless to disobey those who possess their names. The Indo-European verb “to be” (particularly the copula “is”) serves to express the essential identity between the name (or other verbal attributes) and the thing. Concerning the copula Cassirer observed:

The “is” of the copula almost unfailingly goes back to a sensuously concrete original meaning; instead of conveying mere existence or a general state of being, it originally denoted a particular kind and form of appearance; especially being in a certain place, at a specific point in space.

The “presence” peculiar to ontic-ontological objects is an extension of the “essence” implicit in the verb “to be.” By calling the name, the thing is “summoned” and it “appears.” Whereas in magic the name totally controls the thing, at the ontological level the presence summoned by the name also implies the spatial absence of the thing. Kockelmans expressed this notion as follows:

Saying thus calls and brings what is called closer. However, this bringing closer does not bring what is called nearer in the sense of putting it down in the domain of the immediate. Although this calling calls hither what is called, what is called remains at a distance where it remains as absent. Saying therefore calls nearer what is called, but it does not withdraw it from the distance where it was and remains. Saying calls something, as it were, back and forth, calling it to become present and nevertheless summoning it to remain absent at the same time.

Semiology excludes metaphysics. In a semiological system a name is arbitrary and void of magical powers. A semiological element has no “essence”; it is not a “being”; there can be no intrinsic relation between name and essence. The name of a thing only establishes that it is semiologically significant. The act of naming does not imply power over the thing named. According to the rabbis, Adam named not only the animals, but also God. Likewise, “calling upon the name” of someone does not involve any power over him, but simply indicates the will to establish intersubjective communication. The function of the name is to summon the hearer to respond to the invitation.

Scripture teaches that God has a name. This means that God is semiologically accessible. When God charged Moses to tell the children of Israel that He had spoken to him, Moses replied: “And they will ask me ‘What is His name?’—what shall I tell them?” (Exod 3:13). As Maimonides noted, the name in question could not possibly be a special designation that would prove that God had indeed spoken to Moses. If this special designation was already known to the Israelites, the fact that Moses also knew it would not constitute a proof that God had spoken to him. On the other hand, if this name was unknown to them, they could not corroborate whether, in fact, it was revealed by God to Moses or was a fabrication. Moses’ question and God’s response become intelligible upon considering the function of a name in a semiological system. Moses was charged to come before the Hebrews and announce that God had heard their cries. Surely they would ask “What is His name?” that is, “How can we address Him directly and receive a response from Him?” God’s answer was twofold. First, He clarified “I shall be that which I shall be” (Exod 3:14). In magical theology, knowledge of the deity’s name constitutes power over the deity and the ability to manipulate it. The assertion “I shall be that which I shall be” negates magical theology; knowledge of His name does not constitute power over Him. In addition, if the children of Israel wished to speak directly to Him they were to address Him as “the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob; this shall be My name for ever and that will be My designation from generation to generation” (Exod 3:15). This is the manner in which God is traditionally addressed. The Hebrew ‘Amida ‘Silent prayer’ begins with the formula “... our God and the God of our Fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.”

Rather than magical theology, knowledge of God’s name involves the possibility of addressing Him and receiving a response, that is, to pray to God. Indeed, the biblical expression “to call upon the name of God” is synonymous with prayer. The Aramaic translations render “and there Abram called upon the name of God” (Gen 13:4) as “and there Abram prayed to God.”7 To “call upon” God’s name implies receiving a response. “Moses and Aaron, among His priests,” said the Psalmist, “and Samuel among them that call upon His name; they called upon the Lord and He answered them” (Ps 99:6). For the Hebrews, the ultimate test of a religious system is whether or not prayers are answered. Elijah challenged the priests of the Baal, “And you shall call upon the name of your gods, and I shall call upon the name of the Lord: and the God that answers by fire, He is the God” (1 Kings 18:24). Pointedly, Elijah addressed God using the traditional formula: “Lord, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Israel” (1 Kings 18:36), “Israel” being another name for “Jacob.”

“Calling upon” the name of God does not produce an automatic response. First of all, the devotion of the individual addressing God is a factor. The Psalmist emphasizes this point: “God is close to all those who call up to Him: to all those who call up to Him in truth” (Ps 145:12). More important, God’s response is not the result of some magical coercion effected by the utterance of His name. God’s reply is an act of pure volition: it was God Himself who first “called upon” His own name in prayer, teaching thereby how to pray. According to rabbinic tradition, it was God—not Moses—who “called upon the name of God” and said: “the Lord, the Lord, God compassionate and gracious” (Exod 34:6). In order to further emphasize that God’s response is volitional, R. Yohanan described God’s “calling of the name” as follows:

It teaches (metaphorically] that God wrapped Himself (in the prayer mantle], as a minister officiating at the liturgical services, and showed to Moses the liturgical order. He told him: whenever Israel sin let them do before me as in this order and I shall forgive them.

R. Yohanan expressed the same idea by declaring that “God prays,”° that is, that it was God who had established how to speak and plead with Him. The Selihot ‘Supplication Services’ contain the following statement:

You, God, have taught us to say the thirteen attributes of mercy… as it is written in your Tora: “... and (Moses] called upon the name of God” (Exod 34:5). And there it was (further] said: “And the Lord passed before Moses and called: The Lord, the Lord, God compassionate and gracious.” (Exod 34:6)

Finally, to further dispel the notion that there may be any element of coercion, the Scripture states that only because God Himself had (previously) called upon His name, invoking His name brings a response: “In all places where I shall mention My name, I shall come to you and shall bless you” (Exod 20:24). Characteristically, the Aramaic translations render it: “In every place that you will mention My name in prayer, I shall come and bless you.”

Through God the whole Universe is semiologically connected. God maintains a semiological relation not only with man, but with all of Creation. At the end of each of the first three days of Creation, God “calls” what He had created (Gen 1:5, 8, io). This “calling” is a “summons” implying total submission of what was created. As the creator, God “calls” His creatures and summons them to execute His orders. This idea was used by Isaiah to explain the special “calling” of God to Israel. When exhorting Israel to follow God’s summons, Isaiah pointed out how the rest of the Universe “stands up,” in readiness and volition, to obey Him. “Listen to me, Oh Jacob, and Israel the one that I called: I am He, I am the first, I also am the last. My hand also had laid the foundations of the earth, and my right hand spanned the heavens: I call to them; they stand up together” (Isa 48:12—13). Don Isaac Abarbanel (1437—1508) commented on the last verse: “It means that, since I made them ex nihilo, I could do with them as I will, and at the instant that I call upon them to execute My will, they stand up before Me [ready to obey] like servants.” R. Abraham Laniado (d. 1585) observed that ‘to call’ (qore’) is the atemporal participle, implying thereby a continuous act of “calling upon.” Reflecting a position similar to that of David Nieto, Laniado interpreted “standing up” as the effect of God’s continuous calling: things “stand up,” in the sense that they are what they are, because God calls upon them continuously.’ Similarly, his grandson, R. Levi Laniado (seventeenth century) noted that “together” (yahdav) means not only “conjointly” but also “simultaneously.” Thus, the sense of the verse is: simultaneously, at God’s calling, the whole of Creation “stands up,” it becomes what it is. Isaiah wanted to convey to the people of Israel the following idea: “Look up and see how heavens and earth and all that which they contain do not hesitate in executing my word and fulfilling it, but they hasten to execute the word of God. And you, why don’t you listen to me likewise to do my will?” Within the cosmic semiological system, man stands alone not only in his power to refuse to respond to God’s call, but also in his faculty to “call upon the name of God,” that is, to initiate a dialogue with God. As we shall see, this involves man’s ability for intersubjective communication.

Comments

[midbar.livejournal.com]

моя копия уже на пути ко мне. Так что и я скоро начну цитировать ;)

[lkitross.livejournal.com]

Интересно. Не слышал ни автора, ни многих упомянутых в тексте. Что это за книга?
Про Маймонида я писал в газете, но автор добавляет интересные детали.

[lkitross.livejournal.com]

Interesting citations from Wiki:
While teaching at JTS, Faur also offered Torah classes to members of the Syrian community in Brooklyn, New York. This aroused the opposition of certain circles of the right-wing Yeshiva world since they indentified him with the Conservative movement (to which denomination the Jewish Theological Seminary did indeed belong to).
Faur, however, received the support of the Chief Rabbi of the Syrian community, Rabbi Jacob Kassin who signed an open letter attesting to Faur's religious standing. Kassin explained that Faur did not agree with the Conservative movement at all and that he had only taught at the school in order to earn a living.
Lined up against him, however, were several high profile Haredi Rabbis from both the Sephardic and Ashkenazic communties, including Rabbis Moshe Feinstein, Ovadiah Yosef and Elazar Shach.

The pressure was such that Rabbi Kassin retracted his previous support and joined the campaign against Faur.

In the summer of 1987, Faur received support from an unexpected source. The Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem, Rabbi Chalom Messas convened a beit din which examined the allegations against Faur and came to the conclusion that he was innocent of all charges. Chief Sephardic Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu later affirmed the decision as well. But the controversy did not abate. The Lithuanian Yeshiva world's weekly Yated Neeman of February 8, 1998 carried an ad which called for the prevention of the appointing of a Conservative Rabbi to the Syrian congregation Shaare Zion in New York. Aside from his involvement with the seminary, the ad accused him of "speaking improperly about great medieval Ashkenazic sages and this his books emit an odor of heresy". The declaration was signed by 17 Sephardic heads of Yeshivot. Again, under intense pressure, Rabbis Messas and Eliyahu withdrew their earlier support.


At the same time the lessons of R' Kotler and my contacts with fellow students were making me aware of some basic methodological flaws in their approach. The desire to shortcut their way into the Talmud without a systematic and methodological knowledge of basic Jewish texts made their analysis skimpy and haphazard...The dialectics that were being applied to the study of Talmud were not only making shambles out of the text, but, what was more disturbing to me, they were also depriving the very concept of Jewish law, Halacha, of all meaning. Since everything could be "proven" and "disproven", there were no absolute categories of right and wrong. Accordingly, the only possibility of morality is for the faithful to surrender himself to an assigned superior authority; it is the faithful's duty to obey this authority simply because it is the authority and because he is faithful. More precisely, devotion is not to be measured by an objective halacha (it has been destroyed by dialectics) but by obedience. Within this system of morality there was no uniform duty. It was the privilege of the authority to make special dispensations and allowances (hetarim) to some of the faithful; conversely, the authority could impose some new obligation and duties on all or a part of the faithful. To me this was indistinguishable from Christianity

[ymarkov.livejournal.com]

Ага, это цитата (кроме последнего абзаца) из монографии Марка Шапиро "Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox". Эта книга у меня тоже есть, и она довольно интересна.

Курсивом - это, по-видимому, из "Sephardim in Twentieth Century America". Не читал, но верю, что Р' Фаур это сказал - очень на него похоже.

[colbyuwycu.livejournal.com]

Радует, что ваш блог постоянно развивается. (http://zimnyayaobuv.ru/) (http://zimnyaya-obuv.ru/)