"To be sure, this Court has squarely asserted supervisory power to regulate procedure in lower federal courts. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943). While we have not justified this power either, it has an at least argu- able basis: the Constitution’s establishment of this Court as “supreme,” as distinct from the “inferior Courts” that Con- gress has discretion to create. Art. III, §1. Much like the grant of “[t]he judicial Power” carries with it inherent au- thority over local procedure, this Court’s designation as “su- preme” might carry with it some inherent authority to pre- scribe procedural rules for inferior federal courts. But see ante, at 11, n. 1. In the end, this argument might be unsup- ported by the Constitution’s structure and history. Still, the text of Article III makes it plausible."
In other words, "we have asserted certain powers that we have just cut out of whole cloth"
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timeasmymeasure
no subject
Date: 2022-05-04 06:09 pm (UTC)power to regulate procedure in lower federal courts. See
McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943). While we
have not justified this power either, it has an at least argu-
able basis: the Constitution’s establishment of this Court as
“supreme,” as distinct from the “inferior Courts” that Con-
gress has discretion to create. Art. III, §1. Much like the
grant of “[t]he judicial Power” carries with it inherent au-
thority over local procedure, this Court’s designation as “su-
preme” might carry with it some inherent authority to pre-
scribe procedural rules for inferior federal courts. But see
ante, at 11, n. 1. In the end, this argument might be unsup-
ported by the Constitution’s structure and history. Still,
the text of Article III makes it plausible."
In other words, "we have asserted certain powers that we have just cut out of whole cloth"