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ymarkovYates v. United States (not the 1957 Communist case)
Docket No. 13-7451 11th Cir. Nov 5, 2014
Issue: Whether Mr. Yates was deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which makes it a crime for anyone who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object” with the intent to impede or obstruct an investigation, where the term “tangible object” is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns accompanying “tangible object” in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose.
Ginsburg, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Breyer and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Kagan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined.
Excerpts from the plurality opinion:
In short, although dictionary definitions of the words "tangible" and "object" bear consideration, they are not dispositive of the meaning of "tangible object" in §1519. ...
The words immediately surrounding "tangible object" in §1519--"falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record [or] document"--also cabin the contextual meaning of that term. As explained in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995), we rely on the principle of noscitur a sociis -- a word is known by the company it keeps -- to "avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress." ... The noscitur a sociis canon operates in a similar manner here. "Tangible object" is the last in a list of terms that begins "any record [or] document." The term is therefore appropriately read to refer, not to any tangible object, but specifically to the subset of tangible objects involving records and documents, i.e., objects used to record or preserve information.
Excerpts from the minority opinion:
This case raises the question whether the term "tangible object" means the same thing in §1519 as it means in everyday language--any object capable of being touched. The answer should be easy: Yes. The term "tangible object" is broad, but clear. Throughout the U. S. Code and many States' laws, it invariably covers physical objects of all kinds. ...
As the plurality must acknowledge, the ordinary meaning of "tangible object" is "a discrete thing that possesses physical form." Ante, at 7 (punctuation and citation omitted). A fish is, of course, a discrete thing that possesses physical form. See generally Dr. Seuss, One Fish Two Fish Red Fish Blue Fish (1960).
Docket No. 13-7451 11th Cir. Nov 5, 2014
Issue: Whether Mr. Yates was deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which makes it a crime for anyone who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object” with the intent to impede or obstruct an investigation, where the term “tangible object” is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns accompanying “tangible object” in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose.
Ginsburg, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Breyer and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Kagan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined.
Excerpts from the plurality opinion:
In short, although dictionary definitions of the words "tangible" and "object" bear consideration, they are not dispositive of the meaning of "tangible object" in §1519. ...
The words immediately surrounding "tangible object" in §1519--"falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record [or] document"--also cabin the contextual meaning of that term. As explained in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995), we rely on the principle of noscitur a sociis -- a word is known by the company it keeps -- to "avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress." ... The noscitur a sociis canon operates in a similar manner here. "Tangible object" is the last in a list of terms that begins "any record [or] document." The term is therefore appropriately read to refer, not to any tangible object, but specifically to the subset of tangible objects involving records and documents, i.e., objects used to record or preserve information.
Excerpts from the minority opinion:
This case raises the question whether the term "tangible object" means the same thing in §1519 as it means in everyday language--any object capable of being touched. The answer should be easy: Yes. The term "tangible object" is broad, but clear. Throughout the U. S. Code and many States' laws, it invariably covers physical objects of all kinds. ...
As the plurality must acknowledge, the ordinary meaning of "tangible object" is "a discrete thing that possesses physical form." Ante, at 7 (punctuation and citation omitted). A fish is, of course, a discrete thing that possesses physical form. See generally Dr. Seuss, One Fish Two Fish Red Fish Blue Fish (1960).
